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Women's Rights as Human Rights: The Case of Pakistan 
Introduction 
"Women's rights are human rights." These words have become the slogan of millions of 
women and men worldwide who actively work to claim rights for women. Holding not only 
states responsible, but private actors, women's rights activists have begun the process of 
transforming international law and their local communities. This process has been subject to 
debates and scrutiny. Questions about the validity and usefulness of the human rights framework 
have arisen, and this discussion has incorporated diverse voices. Feminists from around the 
world have contributed to this discussion asking how human rights are relevant to their lives. 
Some have decided that this is a worthwhile strategy for gaining redress in systems that 
subordinate women. Some have decided that it is not. The discussion in the first section of this 
paper outlines arguments made by several feminist theorists supporting and challenging the terms 
of international human rights. Their dialogue with supporters and opponents of women's human 
rights raises important questions about how human rights can be applied to transform 
international law and hold state governments responsible for protecting and promoting the rights 
of women. 
The second half of the paper attempts to apply some of the theories and tensions in the 
discourse of women's international human rights to the case of Pakistan. To date there has not 
been a major movement for women's rights in Pakistan. Rather, the relationship of the Pakistani 
state with the majority of its women citizens has been mediated through a small group of elite 
women and men who have had access to state institutions. In fact, the majority of the voices of 
Pakistani women are never heard at the level of international or even national discourse on 
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human rights. Therefore, to discuss "women" as a group in Pakistan is problematic in itself 
because only a certain group of women have been represented by activists as well as by 
scholarship. In order to understand the situations of women in Pakistan, one must also factor in 
the sharp class distinctions as well as the religious and ethnic divisions that separate women into 
various groups with equally varied interests. It is misleading to state that the state treats 
"women" in one way in Pakistan; this assumes that all women share the same interests or have 
the same relationships to ruling institutions 
The current legal status of women in Pakistan was shaped largely by the military regime 
of Zia ul-Haq, which began in 1977 and lasted until 1987. Under his regime a series of 
repressive and regressive laws were passed, which dealt specifically with the treatment of 
women-attempting to strengthen imaginary distinctions between the public and private spheres. 
These laws represented a diversion from the past commitment of the Pakistani state to "secular 
values." They included the Hudood Ordinance, which applies selected conservative 
interpretations of Islamic law in order to decide issues in the sphere of "family law" and sexual 
practices. Documentation on the status of women's rights includes infonnation in reports made 
by local women's and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Pakistan as well 
as United Nations reports, press coverage, and historical surveys-recognizing that these 
institutions too have their own economic and political agendas. 
Section One 
Women's Rights as Human Rights and the Limits of Representation 
Male Bias in the Discourse of Human Rights 
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One of the major problems with current international human rights law is a history that 
has been characterized by male dominance. Because human rights thought is based on the liberal 
philosophical tradition, most of its earliest theorists were European men. Human rights concepts 
are premised largely on the principles of liberal humanism based largely on philosophers such as 
John Locke. Also, the framers of the international human rights documents were mostly men, 
save a few notable figures such as Eleanor Roosevelt. Therefore, women's rights activists must 
constantly grapple with the obvious and the hidden male biases of international law. Hilary 
Charlesworth traces the male bias throughout the three generations of human rights. Briefly, first 
generation rights are categorized as civil and political, valorized in the West (and especially in 
the United States); civil and political rights include the right to vote and freedom of speech. 
Second generation rights include economic, social and cultural rights; this set of rights includes 
the right to health care and unemployment benefits. The third most recently defined category is 
"people's rights" or group rights; this category of rights is developing largely in response to 
indigenous peoples whose rights as groups have historically been violated (Charlesworth, 58). 
Charlesworth says ~'From a women's perspective ... the definition and development of the three 
generations of rights have much in common: they are built on typically male life experiences and 
in their current form do not respond to the most pressing risks women face"(59). Charlesworth 
argues that male bias as an underlying principle of all human rights discourse and one that must 
be subject to critique from a diverse group of feminists. Because of the lack of women's 
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participation in the fonnulation of rights and because the Western philosophical tradition has 
been largely premised on the ideas of a few European men, there are many reasons to be wary of 
universal human rights nonns. Human rights must be constantly dissected and reconceptualized 
in order to clarify and remedy some of these biases. 
Cynthia Romany sites the liberal foundations of human rights law and the false division 
between the public and private spheres as a major barrier in the realization of women's rights. 
Negative freedoms, such as the right to be left alone in one's home without the interference of 
the state, underlie the liberal state. This right sanctifies the private sphere and works to 
subordinate women within the walls of the home(Romany 93), Romany argues that there is a 
gender stratification built into the liberal state. Because women's rights in the private sphere are 
ignored in the foundations of liberalism, Romany argues that: 
Women are the paradigmatic alien subjects of international law. To be alien is to be 
another, to be an outsider. Women are aliens within their states, aliens within an 
international exclusive club that constitutes international society. (Romany 85) 
Because international human rights law is premised on male models, women are in effect 
invisible from the formulation of rights. Romany argues for the dissolution of the public/private 
split within international human rights law. She cites Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the first 
advocates for an international human rights framework who said: 
Where after all, do human rights begin? In small places, close to home-so close and so 
small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the 
individual person: the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the 
factory, fanns or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman or 
child seeks justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity, without discrimination. Unless these 
rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. (Romany 90) 
Roosevelt's conception of human rights therefore crossed the boundaries of public and private. 
She used the language of individualism taken from the tradition of liberal philosophical thought 
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without taking the public/private dichotomy that has been one of the major principles of Western 
thought. Romany says that women's civil and political rights are systematically denied in the 
private sphere as part of the "global structure of gender subordination"(Romany 90). She thus 
implicates the entire world, not only the West, in reinforcing the false boundaries between public 
and private. In fact, the dichotomy between public and private spheres has not only been a part 
of the Western liberal tradition; as we will later discuss in detail, it has also been a part of the 
rhetoric oflslamist groups as has been the case in Pakistan. Nira Yuval-Davis argues that this is 
a false dichotomy and says that "A sphere marked as 'private' at one stage of nation-building 
may reappear with the full trappings of the 'public' at another, their boundaries being fluid and 
subject to redefinition"(Kandiyoti 380). Therefore, the codification of the pUblic/private split 
often ends up reinforcing reifications made by the state or other nationalizing forces for political 
purposes. 
The danger of this dichotomy is most clear in the case of domestic violence. For those 
affected by domestic violence, the notion of a private sphere that cannot be affected by the law of 
the state provides no recourse for their violations and reinforces the horror of their abuse. 
Rhonda Copelon focuses on the problem of domestic (intimate) violence and says that this is not 
viewed as real violence by states and society. She says, "When stripped of pl;vatization, sexism, 
and sentimentalism, gender-based violence is no less grave than other forms of inhumane and 
subordinating official violence, which have been prohibited by treaty and customary law and 
recognized by the international community asjus cogens, or peremptory norms that bind 
universally and can never be violated." (Copelon 117) Copelon compares what is recognized as 
official torture, or state-sponsored torture, with domestic violence against women. In shifting the 
language of domestic violence, she breaks the false separation between public and private 
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spheres. States must be held accountable for what occurs in the home as they are held 
accountable for state-sponsored torture. The walls of legal discourse have served to nonnalize 
and n1ask grave instances of torture that women face on a daily basis within the confines of the 
"private" sphere. In Pakistan the public/private distinction is used strategically by both state and 
non-state actors in the discourse on domestic violence. However, the women's lives do not 
always remain in the private sphere. In the case of the Hudood Ordinance, women's sexuality 
becomes an issue of public concern. Women in Pakistan are strategically made public and private 
by the state, usually to their detriment. I examine this problem more closely in the second part of 
the paper. 
Most feminist thought around international human rights law has not breached the 
division of the two spheres, and this has left this division largely in tact in human rights treaties. 
This is because feminist critiques of law initially began as a branch of "liberal" feminism. This 
brand of feminism "identifies sexual equality with equal treatment, rejecting any notion that the 
law should tolerate or recognize intrinsic differences between women and men"(Charlesworth 
63). Feminist critics have worked for women being treated "like men" in the public sphere while 
not identifying this division itself as a fundamental barrier towards the realization of women's 
rights. This has been the approach of current international human rights law, and this rationale 
underlies the majority of the United Nations treaties on human rights including the International 
Covenant on Civil Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. These documents imply that women must confonn to male models in order to 
fall under their protection (Charlesworth 64). However, this approach does not address systemic 
issues of the gender division of power. It reinforces the basic organization of society with male 
models imposed on women. Charleworth argues that "The promise of equality as 'sameness' as 
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men only gives women access to a world already constituted"(Charlesworth 64). This vision 
gives women no voice in reconceptualizing rights to reflect their own realities. Charlesworth 
argues that this is also true of the Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDA W), which privileges women in the public sphere while inadequately 
addressing the problems that women face within the home--often the site of their greatest 
oppression (Charlesworth 64). For example Article One of CEDA W states: 
Article 1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the tenn "discrimination against 
women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field. (gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/gn/cedaw/col1vention) 
This article privileges the idea of equality of the sexes, but does not address the tenns for this 
equality. According to Charlesworth, "The fundamental problem women face worldwide is not 
discriminatory treatment compared with men, although this is a manifestation of a larger 
problem" ( Charlesworth 60). The discrimination women face is based on powerlessness in both 
the public and the private realms, and international human rights law instruments do nothing to 
remedy this state of powerlessness (Charlesworth 60). Feminist theorists including Charlesworth 
stress the importance of difference recognizing that equality as it has been previously fonnulated, 
relies on male models. However, arguing for difference creates the same kind of problems. One 
must ask the question: difference in whose image? Because all women are not different from 
men in the same way, and some are not very different at all, arguing for difference in 
international law is problematic and can end in an essentialist position that is potentially more 
damaging to women. This tension between equality and difference-based models remains within 
the discourse of women's rights, and it must continue to be explored by feminist theorists. 
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"I'm Every Woman "?: Cultural Relativism versus Universalism 
"As a woman I have no country. As a woman my country is the whole world."-Virginia Woolf 
One of the most widely discussed conflicts within the field of human rights has been 
between the promotion of universal human rights values versus cultural relativism. For women, 
this debate is particularly relevant. Often women are subordinated under the guise of "culture." 
At the same time women from the "Third World" have historically not had a voice in the 
formulation of international human rights. Rather, feminism and rights have been dictated by the 
realities of Western women. This debate continues today and some of its most vocal participants 
have been defenders of women's rights. In fact, there is no simple binary opposition between 
cultural relativist and universalist positions. The most effective method of applying human rights 
across cultures, while including the voices of women and men from all social and geographic 
positions, works through culture in order to enrich human rights discourse and allow for broad 
acceptance of these notions. 
The first argument is between those who propose universal human rights for all people 
including women and those who think that women's rights cannot be decided by international 
law, but should be based on individual cultures. Feminists from the "Third World" have been 
the leaders in breaking down the myth of "cultureH as a guise for women's subordination. Deniz 
Kandiyoti, a feminist theorist who focuses on gender and the Middle East, analyzes on the ways 
that national identity and cultural difference are used to exert control over women in nation-
building projects (Kandiyoti 376). Emphasizing women's lack of rights as citizens, she says that 
dominant forces in the nation use cultural difference to mask women's subordination. 
'II 
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Abdullahi An-Na'im, a Muslim legal scholar and advocate, walks a line between 
abandoning notions of culture altogether and treating culture as a stable entity under which 
women can legitimately be subordinated. He argues for universal human rights without 
discarding the importance of gaining cultural legitimacy for these rights to be meaningful. An-
Na'im discusses the problems of claiming that human rights are culturally illegitimate: "To claim 
that something is culturally legitimate or illegitimate presupposes a settled and well-defined set 
of standards and a fair and consistent process by which those standards are applied"(172). 
Culture itself is a problematic concept. There is no one culture that defines a group of people, 
and therefore, to use culture as a defense against the introduction of universal human rights 
values raises questions about who is defining the terms of the dominant culture. An-Na'im asks: 
"What about alternative or competing standards of cultural legitimacy? What is the nature and 
dynamics of power relations among the various holders of various views or positions, and how 
are their interests affected by the issues in question?"(An-Na'im 173). These questions are 
extremely important when discussing the cultural relevance of human rights especially in regards 
to women. Opponents of international standards for women often claim cultural illegitimacy as 
their basis as if culture were a static monolith on which all people agreed. Women are often not 
heard in discussions between the definers of national culture. Though there is validity in some 
claims of cultural imperialism especially in post-colonial contexts, it should not be presupposed 
that all claims of cultural illegitimacy are valid or have the interests of women in mind. In order 
for human rights to be effectively promoted An-Na'im suggests that "human rights advocates 
need to understand the process of cultural legitimacy and change, and utilize that process 
effectively in their efforts to enhance the implementation and enforcement of human rights 
standards throughout the world"(An-Na'im 173). 
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The dialogue about cultural relativism in human rights has affected larger human rights 
organizations in their practice. For example, Amnesty International's (AI) report on Violence 
against Women in Pakistan addresses some of the arguments against writing about "customary" 
practices as human rights abuses propagated by cultural relativists. The report states that 
Amnesty welcomes a rich variety of cultures and traditions and that the universality of human 
rights benefits from this diversity of voices, 
but cultures are not static. They are continually changing and evolving in response to 
interactions with other cultures, the needs of society and the demands of the modem age. 
'Tradition' may have emphasized certain norms in the past, but this does not preclude 
tradition being shaped by new realities. (AI 3) 
This reflects Amnesty's position on the use of culture as a defense of abuses against women. For 
Amnesty it is an unacceptable argument premised on a superficial understanding of culture. The 
influence of feminists in this dialogue has allowed organization like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch to recognize the fluidity between the public sphere into the private sphere 
and deal with subjects such as domestic violence and honor killings, which had previously been 
shrouded in the protective shroud of "culture." Their report on honor killings in Pakistan has 
provided much of the material for this paper. 
The questions raised within the context of universal women's rights also include: Are 
women a group? What does it mean to defend women's rights when women are such a varied 
group of people? Does this language falsely create unity by silencing some groups of women and 
privileging others? Or does the concept of "women's human rights" have grounding in the 
commonalities in women's lives across the globe? These questions must be constantly asked by 
activists and scholars of human rights. These questions arise from a history of Western feminism 
having a dominant voice in the international arena. Historically, poor women, women of color, 
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and women from the developing world have not had a voice in the fonnulation of the discourse 
on women's rights. Western feminists have interpreted the realities of women of the developing 
world for them. Therefore, not only does rights discourse have a male bias, the small number of 
women that have been represented are historically advantaged groups of women. To posit the 
notion of "women's human rights" then is dangerous, and without critical analysis and 
transfonnation, this discourse runs the risk of repeating historical wrongs that privilege the 
experience of certain women over others. For example, women's rights must also take into 
account the complex web of discrimination that most women face based not only on their gender, 
but also on their race and class. 
Hilary Charlesworth addresses the critiques made by some women of color and "Third 
World" women of the tendency of white Western feminists to impose their own view of rights on 
other women by universalizing their claims. This has constituted a Hfeminist brand of 
colonialism." Charlesworth does not propose a cross-cultural solution to this problem within 
human rights discourse. She quotes Peggy Antrobus who says: 
Although we are divided by race, class, culture and geography, our hope lies in our 
commonalities. All women's unrenumerated household work is exploited, we all have 
conflicts in our mUltiple roles, our sexuality is exploited by men, media and the economy, 
we struggle for survival and dignity, and , rich or poor, we are vulnerable to violence. We 
share Hothemess," our exclusion from decision-making at all levels. (Charlesworth 62) 
This description of women's global condition glosses over some real discrepancies of power 
between women on a global level. Because there is a worldwide system of gender stratification, 
and those working to change this system base their work on principles of justice and equality, to 
be effective and honest, the discourse of women's international human rights must be based on 
the dialogue and contributions of the most diverse group of people possible. This discourse must 
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reflect structural inequalities of power based on color, geography, class, and sexuality. For 
women's human rights language to be effective and a transformative tool it is crucial that it 
address the historical inequalities of power not only between men and women but between 
women and women. A discourse that only speaks of women as a monolithic "Other" will simply 
not be adequate as will repeat the mistakes of human rights discourse in the past, creating more 
hierarchies of rights. Creating a rights discourse by ignoring differences between women will not 
be sufficient. When commonalities do not exist between for example a white woman in the 
United States employed by a multinational corporation and a Pakistani woman living in the 
NWFP and working for less-than-subsistence wages, the Pakistani woman's rights must still be 
voiced at the international level. 
Several theorists on the subject of human rights support a process of a cross-cultural 
dialogue about women's human rights. Rebecca Cook stresses the importance of dialogue 
between women from different contexts: 
It is important in order to ensure that we are not divided as women-north and south-
and that northern feminists are not missionary feminists but really global feminists who 
are listening and developing practical theories so that human rights really will benefit all 
women. (Cook 14) 
Cook focuses on the need for privileged feminists to use their resources to empower women 
around the world, rather than becoming paralyzed by guilt or fear of reinforcing an unequal 
global power structure. This too runs the risk of recreating historical hierarchies of power. 
However, women from privileged positions must recognize their privilege and work in 
partnership with women from the developing world in order to move forward. Similarly Romany 
argues that, "A feminist critique of human rights law needs to engage in a dialogue which forces 
the anti-subordination thrust of feminism through the filter of cultural diversity"{ 1 06). This 
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dialogue would seek to transcend the "relativistic paralysis since in 'a world of radical inequality, 
relativist resignation reinforces the status quo "'(Romany 106). Romany does not want to ignore 
the problem of cultural difference, and envisions a continuing dialogue with the goal of creating 
real and lasting change. Cultural differences should not be ignored, but they should also not 
hinder the process of enforcing and protecting the rights of women. 
An-Na'im elaborates on the process of cross-cultural exchange and internal dialogue on 
human rights. He stresses the importance of gaining cultural legitimacy for international human 
rights norms. An-Na'im recognizes the existing Eurocentric and androcentric bias of 
international human rights law (An-Na'im 171). However, cultural or feminist critiques should 
not cause a blanket abandonment of international human rights standards. This is why space for 
criticism and change must always remain open, and cases against rights that are deemed 
detrimental to women or culturally oppressive should be brought to the table and considered 
carefully. In order for international human rights standards to gain legitimacy in local contexts, 
the effort to promote and sustain rights must be perceived as a Hreciprocal global collaborative 
effort"(An-Na'im 173). If there is no active discussion about international human rights in local 
communities, human rights will not gain validity in people's lives and they will not only not be 
accepted they will never be effective. An'Na-im calls this process "internal discourse," which he 
says must take place simultaneously with a process of cross-cultural dialogue in order to for 
human rights to gain meaning in local contexts (174). An effort to change religious or customary 
laws that are not a part of the formal state law, but are often the most powerfully restrictive 
forces in women's lives, should not be forced on people. Rather, the state has a responsibility to 
persuade people of the validity and benefit of changing customary laws in accordance with 
international human rights law (An-Na'im 177). This process can take place through public 
education and state-supported dialogue. Without this kind of education and dialogue, human 
rights will have no meaning in the lives of the people they are meant to protect. They will also 
never be changed to reflect a wider group of voices, non-western and feminist. Without 
abandoning the project of creating a more just world for women, the questions of cultural 
legitimacy and relativism can serve to transform human rights and push the envelope of 
international law further. 
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The benefits of a heterogeneous worldwide movement for women's rights are numerous. 
Copelon argues that women can be treated as a group by international law and uses the case of 
violence as a binding principle between all women. She says that gender-based violence should 
be recognized not only as a domestic issue but also as an international human rights issue. 
Gender-based violence "violates the human rights of women as persons to integrity, security, and 
dignity, and ... constitutes discrimination against women as a group in that its purpose is to 
maintain both the individual woman and women as a class in an inferior, subordinated 
position"[emphasis added](Copelon 130). This is one issue that many feminists have cited as a 
common experience among women across cultures in their arguments for universal human rights. 
Women across various cultures and classes face violence in the private sphere. Joining with 
women across the world to fight for international standards of protection adds strength to women 
in local communities struggling to gain protection of their rights within the private sphere. Of 
course, this is not saying that violence is experienced in the same way or at the same rate across 
the world, but it does occur in some form in the vast majority of places around the world. 
Domestic violence is one area where women's rights activists have managed to forge broad cross-
cultural alliances in order to bring this issue into the purview of international law. 
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The Rights of Muslim Women in Post-colonial Contexts 
For women living in Muslim contexts, often in post-colonial states, there are several 
forces dictating the their position in society and their rights in the state and in the family. These 
forces manipulate religion and "culture" in order to assign roles to women. Often the forces of 
religious conservatism invoke Islam in order to further nationalist projects. In this process 
women become boundary markers of the group rather than human beings, and in this process 
rights are often granted and rescinded according to the needs of the nation. Several feminist 
theorists of the Arab world also place cultural resistance to women's emancipation within the 
context of relations with an imperialistic West (Kandiyoti 384). This relationship adds another 
layer of power relations for feminists to wade through in their search for local assertion of human 
rights. For women in Pakistan, the discussion of Muslim women in post-colonial contexts in 
particularly relevant. 
Deniz Kandiyoti draws on feminist critiques of nationalism, arguing that the nation may 
be just as constraining to women as the systems it has supposedly replaced, primordial loyalties 
to lineage, tribe or kin, Hthe difference being that such demands are enforced by the state and its 
legal administrative apparatus rather than by individual patriarchs"(377). Women are 
marginalized even as their importance as part of nationalizing projects is being reaffinned. 
Kandiyoti argues that this contradiction in nationalist rhetoric "is reaffinned consciously ... where 
the nation itself is represented as a woman to be protected or, less consciously, in an intense 
preoccupation with women's appropriate sexual conduct"(Kandiyoti 377). This preoccupation is 
evidenced in Pakistan by such repressive measures as the Hudood Ordinance, which will be 
examined more closely in the second part of this paper. Kandiyoti builds on the work of C. 
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Pateman who says that modem civil society remains a patriarchal category. The transition from a 
traditional to modem world is 441a change from traditional (paternal) fonn of patriarchy to a new 
specifically modem (or fraternal) fonn: patriarchal civil society"'(Kandiyoti 377). She also 
refers to B.S. Walby who says that patriarchy in modem society incorporates women within it, 
but at the same time, subordinates women. For Walby there are two kinds of patriarchy: private 
patriarchy, characterized by exclusion of women in all sectors of life-women must be confined 
to the home, and public patriarchy, where women are not excluded from the public arena but are 
subordinated within it (Kandiyoti 377). In post-colonial states this shift does not transfer more 
power into the hands of women. Rather, power is transferred from one group of men to another. 
Therefore, modem civil society does not necessarily mean an expansion of rights for women. In 
Pakistan women are doubly subordinated by private and public patriarchies. Their rights are 
constrained both by the family and community as well as formally by discriminatory state 
legislation. 
Kandiyoti argues that women are interpellated as national actors: "mothers, educators, 
workers, and even fighters. On the other hand, they reaffirm the boundaries of culturally 
acceptable feminine conduct and exert pressure on women to articulate their gender interests 
within the terms of reference set by the nationalist discourse. Feminism is not autonomous, but 
bound to the dignifying network of the national context which produces it"(Kandiyoti 380). 
Feminists working within for gains in women's rights must couch their arguments in the terms 
set by nationalist discourse. In Muslim states, such as Pakistan, this translates into very limited 
discursive boundaries. For feminists in Muslim contexts there have been two main options for 
voicing their demands: A) denying that Islamic practices are necessarily oppressive or B) 
denying the fact that oppressive practices are necessarily Islamic. The first option compares 
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Muslim women to the commodified, exploited Other, the Western woman. This reifies Western 
women in order to assert the superiority of Islamic laws. The second option invokes the myth of 
a "golden age" in Islam in which women supposedly had more rights and freedoms. Current 
discrimination against women is then argued as "un-Islamic." Both of these options operate 
within the boundaries of accepted national discourse. "Changing the tenns of this discourse 
exacts a heavy price: alienation from the shared meanings which constitute a language of 
identity, affiliation and 10yalty"(Kandiyoti 380). Feminists in Muslim countries including 
Pakistan face severe limitations on the articulation of their demands. The walls of discourse are 
narrow and rigid, and this presents further obstacles on women's human rights activists. 
Marie Helie-Lucas also addresses this fear of alienation from the community and the 
political arena. In the quest for the preservation of Muslim identity, Islamists speak mostly to an 
external threat to identity. However, women and the educated elite are often considered weak 
points in this defensive system as well as potential allies of the external enemy (Helie-Lucas 
393). This greatly limits women activists' response to Islamist arguments within Pakistan. 
Helie-Lucas says that "at a political level, they fear being accused of betraying the whole; at a 
cultural level, traditions are defined as immutable; at a religious level, the end of interpretation of 
the Qur'an confines women into a model of society, way of life, dress, behavior as close as 
possible to the historical model born in the Middle East 14 centuries ago; and finally, at a legal 
level, the emphasis is on Personal Laws as a means to defend identity"(Helie-Lucas 393). 
Therefore, the fear of being labeled as traitors to the culture or nation is used to keep women's 
(and their supporters') voices and behavior within rigid boundaries. The basis of identity become 
fixed and narrow and women lose space for any kind of interpretation. A questioning of any 
social more or legal injunction with the label "Islam" preceding is equal to blasphemy. 
Therefore, Helie-Lucas argues that "Muslim peoples and certainly women are made to believe 
that their local traditions are part and parcel of being Muslim and-in the final analysis-
Islamic"(395). 
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One should not underestimate the impact of Islamist discourses on identity and the 
symbolic importance of women on the minds of women themselves. Women activists limit their 
criticism and often accept the notion that universal values of social justice exist in the public 
sphere, but to argue for universal rights in the private sphere is arguing for westernization: 
"Consequently, defending universal values of social justice becomes unacceptable when it comes 
to the woman question. This is why, instead of going straight to the point, women first try to 
demonstrate that they are alienated in non-indigenous ideologies, that they do not side with 
external enemies"(Helie-Lucas 399). They expend time and energy trying to distinguish 
themselves from Western feminists as Third World feminists, as if there were a binary opposition 
between the West and the developing world. In effect, they must take on an apologetic tone and 
a defensive stance in their arguments against blatant violation of their rights. 
Kandiyoti says that in the post-colonial countries of the Middle East and South Asia, the 
process of nation-building is often brought about through citizenship, equality of all citizens 
before the law, and mass education to create a cohesive group. However this impulse towards 
unification has often not held true for women in the realm of personal or family law. The legal 
equality granted to women under the constitutions of modem states is more often than not 
circumscribed by family legislation, privileging men in the areas of divorce, child custody, 
maintenance and inheritance rights.(Kandiyoti 383). Women and men are invested with different 
roles in these nationalizing projects. Women are encouraged to be "modern-yet-modest" 
(Kandiyoti 379). They are often fed with contradictory messages depending on the regime in 
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power as well as their social status. The identification of women as privileged bearers of 
corporate identities and boundary markers of their communities has had a deleterious effect on 
their emergence as full-fledged citizens of modem nation-states. This is nowhere more evident 
than in the fact that women's hard-won civil-rights become the most immediate casualty of the 
breakdown of secularist projects (Kandiyoti 388). She cites R. Jahan who says "With growing 
popular discontent and endemic legitimacy crises, governments may make the tactical choice of 
relinquishing the control of women to their immediate communities and families, thereby 
depriving their female citizens of legal protection (Kandiyoti 387). The instability of women's 
rights in Pakistan was made evident during the regime of Zia-ul Haq, as he questioned all the 
rights women had won since Partition during his program of Islamisation. 
Helie-Lucas points out that though HFundamentalistsni have diverse movements around 
the world, their discourses offer a consensus on two issues; these two issues are the quest for 
identity and lithe woman question." In a wide range of contexts, Islamists promote the idea that 
Islam is in danger. "Islam as both a religion and a cultural identity is always in danger, whether it 
is threatened by colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, socialism, foreign ideologies or other 
dominant religions"(Helie-Lucas 391). Islamists have succeeded in identifying one area as the 
essence of Islamic identity and this is the private sphere. "They therefore concentrate their efforts 
on Personal Law and on the family, which become the epitome of Islamic politics, a 
condensation of all other identities, and a place of refuge. Whoever challenges this refuge 
threatens all the mUltiple identities at once, as well as the essence of identity." Within the 
ideology of Islamists, such as the Jamaat-I-Islami in Pakistan, both religion and history are 
viewed as fixed and static. They speak of getting back to traditions, roots, and values held in this 
glorified and ossified past (Helie-Lucas 392). Muslim laws are in fact grounded in history and 
culture and are used at different times for different political purposes (Helie-Lucas 395). 
20 
An-Na'im focuses specifically on the use of Shar'ia (law based on Islamic precepts 
including, but not limited to, the Qur' an) in restricting human rights and especially the rights of 
women. He states that "Shari'a family law is fundamentally premised on the notion of male 
guardianship over women (qawama), and is consequently characterized by many features of 
inequality between men and women in marriage, divorce, and related matters"(An-Na'im 181). 
Shari 'a in many ways reinforces women's submission and dependency on men. An-Na'im 
stresses the historical context of Shari'a laws. These laws formulated by early male Muslim 
jurists. These jurists were not engaged in constructing a divine or eternal system of laws (as 
many Islamists now claim). Therefore, An-Na'im believes that it is imperative for modern 
Muslim scholars and jurists to reinterpret Shari'a for their own historical contexts. This process 
of reinterpretation should be supported again by internal discourse across genders and classes and 
by cross-cultural dialogue (An-Na'im 183). This position is extremely controversial in the eyes 
of most Islamists. In their view neither the Qur'an nor the Hadith of the Prophet can be 
historically interpreted. For advocates of human rights in Muslim contexts, the conservative 
interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence leaves no space for argument. If this reinterpretation 
occurs, An-Na'im is hopeful that Shar'ia can stop being repressive and can be brought in line by 
local actors with international human rights norms and standards. An 'Na'im gives advocates for 
women's rights and human rights in Muslim contexts a strategy for change and the positive 
evolution of local contexts. Though he believes in universal human rights norms, he also 
recognizes that they are meaningless without the sanction of local cultures and the critical 
dialogue of diverse groups of people. By working within cultural norms, while realizing that 
"culture" is not fixed, An-Na'im provides a practical model for incorporating human rights in 
local communities. Human rights norms imposed by the state are usually met with resistance; 
this top-down strategy also goes against the principles of equality, and justifiably opens human 
rights norms and defenders to criticisms on the basis of cultural irrelevance. 
Reconceptualizing Human Rights in a Feminist Framework 
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The discourse of rights must always acknowledge the indivisibility of all human rights in 
relation to each other and to the public and private spheres. Romany connects all of the 
"spheres" of human rights together. She says that violence against women fits in a "continuum 
of subordination" that affects all aspects of women's lives: "Women are deprived of 
participation since they 'cannot lend [their] labor or creative ideas to fully when [they] are 
burdened with the physical and psychological scars of violence"(Romany 1 08). A violation in 
one area of life, be it economic, social or political, affects every other part of life. Ideally, a 
feminist vision of human rights breaks down the dangerous barriers between public and private 
and also breaks down the walls between economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. A 
feminist understanding of human rights promotes radical indivisibility of all rights and fluidity 
between boundaries of public and private realizing that these walls and distinctions do not reflect 
the lives of real women and men and only work to hinder the realization of rights by all people. 
A feminist understanding reflects differences between women and men and women and women 
across the globe, remaining sensitive to historically voiceless groups and actively working to 
remedy this inequality. A feminist vision seeks not to erase these differences by promoting 
liberal equality. Rather, it encourages people in different contexts to imagine difference and 
justice simultaneously without imposing one version of equality on diverse groups of people. 
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The second half of this paper looks more closely at women's rights issues in Pakistan and the 
problems of discourse and advocacy that arise in this context. 
Section Two 
Women's Human Rights: the Case of Pakistan 
Historical Background 
"It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of houses as 
prisoners. There is no sanction anywhere for the deplorable conditions in which our women 
have to live. You should take your women along with you in as comrades in every sphere of 
life." -Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 1944 
The year 1947 saw the independence of the subcontinent from the rule of the British, and 
the emergence of the independent nations, India and Pakistan. During this period, lines between 
nations were drawn almost arbitrarily by leaders and two distinct processes of nation-building 
were officially initiated. Discussion of women's rights preceded the Partition of India and 
Pakistan. For Muslims it had been a documented subject of debate for years. The above 
quotation is taken from a speech made by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, known as the founder of 
Pakistan, in a pre-Partition address to Aligarh University (Malik 143). His words are indicative 
of the changing attitudes (at least at a rhetorical level) towards women's participation in the 
public sphere during the time of early-nation formation. Women's rights advocates emerged 
before Partition lobbying for such acceptable changes as increased education and a ban on early 
child marriages. Women's voices were present from the time of the first articulation of the desire 
for a separate state by the All-India Muslim League in 1940 (Jalal 84). Notable figures such as 
Fatimah Jinnah (Muhammad Ali Jinnah's sister) emerged as strong political leaders in the decade 
after Partition. Ayesha lalal follows the discourse on women's rights in Pakistan in the period 
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leading up to and since Partition (Jalal 77). Historically women's rights have been subject to the 
needs of the nation as interpreted by its leaders. Shahnaz Rouse says that even when the state was 
supportive ofwomen's incorporation in the public realm in the case ofwomen's education, it 
was only under the pretext that educated women made better wives and mothers (55). Therefore, 
as Kandiyoti points out women's rights were constructed to fit the needs of the nation. Despite 
the large amount of rhetoric on the issue of women's rights, little actual progress has been made, 
especially for the vast majority of Pakistani women (Jalal 77).Though there were notable women 
leaders in the short history of Pakistan, there has yet to be a strong movement across classes for 
change in women's status, a point I will return to later. It is important to note that the founders 
of the Pakistani state (including Jinnah) did not express any intentions of translating their Islamic 
rhetoric, employed primarily for political purposes, into actual policy (Jalal 86). Their intentions 
as to the role of Islam in the state were in fact unclear. Jinnah was known as a secularist, though 
his secular leanings have intentionally been obscured by religious conservatives. ii 
Before Zia-ul-Haq's military government, Pakistan was ruled by the Pakistan People's 
Party (PPP) under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. During Bhutto's regime, women made 
little legal progress though the rhetoric of the time was for women's promotion in the public 
sphere. This state's official support for women's rights did allow for some positive 
developments. For example, Pakistan was one of the cosponsors ofCEDAW in 1975 (though it 
would not become a signatory until over 20 years later)(Weiss 417). During this time the 
Pakistani state was pushed one step closer to Islamisation and the support of the military through 
the widespread belief promulgated by the opposition to Bhutto and the PPP who said that it was 
the state's lack of Islamic morality that caused the disintegration of Pakistan (after the 
independence of Bangladesh) (Jalal 97). Bhutto was perceived as a secular leader whose 
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government had failed to build a stronger Pakistan. Zubaida argues that the failure of nation-
fonnation resides not on some essential property of political culture or ethnic conlposition, but 
on the lack of economic and political achievements, which gives citizens a stake in the national 
entity and promotes national stability. The failure of states to create and distribute resources 
adequately intensifies conflicts and cleavages expressed in religious, ethnic and regional tenns 
(Kandiyoti 387). Kandiyoti suggests that the extremely unequal distribution of wealth and 
resources mark a failure of the nation. Because of this perceived failure, citizens of the nation 
must look for scapegoats and alternate systems of organization for what they see as a failed state. 
This perception of Bhutto as a failed leader and his association with secular values opened a 
space in the political arena for a military dictator such as Zia to wrest power. The movement that 
eventually brought down Bhutto's government, Nizam-e-MustaJa (the system of the Prophet), 
was based on the idea that the Pakistani state lacked Islamic morality, and this was the cause of 
the state's weakness. This movement included within its demands that women be returned to the 
chardivari (the four walls) of their homes (JalalI 00), an idea that Zia-ul-Haq would later build 
into his Islamisation program. iii This building of Islamic fervor was happening concurrently in 
the 70s as more and more women were entering the public domain. Jalal does not attribute the 
growing atmosphere of freedom for women to Bhutto's policies; she says rather that Bhutto's 
"populist" policies were based primarily on class rather than gender, though many wonlen did 
benefit (Jalal 98). Bhutto's populist ideals encompassed women in the project of nation building 
and his rhetoric in support of women's rights was part of his larger popUlist strategy. 
This paper focuses on some of the major women's rights issues that have sparked 
considerable local activism since 1977. This was the year that Zia-ul Haq overthrew the elected 
government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and started a process of increased Islamisation in Pakistan. 
How did this emphasis on conservative Islam, so detrimental to women's rights, emerge? 
Shahnaz Rouse points out the contradictions that have been present within the Pakistani state 
since its inception: 
Within Pakistan, constitutional debates, religious lobbying, and judicial and political 
pressuring have all sought over and over again to address the issue of whether Pakistan 
was intended as merely a country 'of Muslims' or a country 'for Muslims.(Rouse 54) 
The founders of Pakistan were faced with a contradiction: on the one hand the justification for 
Pakistan was based on Islam, and on the other, the early leaders of Pakistan had strong secular 
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leanings. This confusion left gaps within the founding ideology of the nation, gaps that could be 
filled by various ideologies, shifting state policies according to the whims of its leaders. This 
initial contradiction has remained unresolved throughout the political history of the nation, and 
has left open the possibility of the legislation of retrogressive laws passed in the name of 
conservative Islam. Shahnaz Rouse suggests that it is misleading to divide Pakistan's history 
into two time periods, pre- and post-Zia and his policies of Islamisation. iv In fact, religion and 
the state have had a long and complex relationship within Pakistan well before 1977. However, 
though Zia's policies should be placed in historical context, 1977 did mark a shift in the nation's 
recent history. This ideological shift has left deep wounds on the few rights women in Pakistan 
had managed to gain since Partition. 
Islamisation under Zia: The Hudood Ordinance 
On July 5, 1977 General Zia-ul Haq overthrew the democratically elected government of 
Bhutto through a military coup. Anita Weiss says, "In its search for a basis of legitimacy ... the 
government implemented a religiously based legal code unparalleled in the modern history of 
South Asia"(Weiss 417). Though he promised swift elections and a return to democratic rule, 
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Pakistan would not see a new leader until 1988. Zia did not embark on his intense program of 
Islamisation until 1979 with the passage of a series of regressive laws targeting women and 
minorities. When Zia replaced Bhutto as the leader of the nation, he argued that Islam, Pakistan 
and the military were all linked. He appropriated the call for Nizam-e-MustaJa from Bhutto's 
opposition. He also included women in his program of Islamisation, promising to protect the 
chador (veil) and the chardivari as symbols of women's honor and the sanctity of the family. 
Shahnaz Rouse is critical of those who claim that Zia's regime began with a direct assault 
on women's rights. Rather, she says that Zia began his regime by launching an assault on all 
Pakistani democratic institutions, thus quelling any possibility for opposition (Rouse 59). Zia's 
regime formed its policies to emphasize difference, not only of women, but also of Shias, 
Ahmadiyyas, Christians, and ethnic minorities from the Hhegemonic ideal of the individual (read: 
male) Pakistani, a Sunni Muslim committed to protecting the entire geographic territory of 
Pakistan against encroachment from its threatening others, be they internal or external''tV(Rouse 
59). Therefore, all boundaries between groups became more rigid after 1977. The Islamisation 
program that was so detrimental to women's rights, also affected the rights of minority men and 
women. The current blasphemy laws as well as the organized attacks on Ahmadiyyas are proof 
of the state's anti-minority stance. For poor minority women, there have been multiple levels of 
repression by the state. Women's oppression should be viewed as a part--a very important part--
of a broader framework of state control of Hthreateningn groups. J alaI suggests that these values 
of separation struck a chord with broad sectors of the society, including the members of the upper 
class. She says, "With memories of 'populism' still fresh in their minds, specifically the 
glimpses it had given them of the very real potential for anarchy among a poor and illiterate 
populace, even upper-class liberals were not about to challenge a return to moral decency if it 
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meant more security and protection for women"(Jalal101). This suggests that it was in the 
interests of members of the upper class to support a more controlled and rigid social order. Zia's 
military government held the promise of stability for those who saw a threat from the 
disenfranchised classes during the period of increased populism under Bhutto. The control of 
women was part of this rigid social order. 
During Zia's regime, women's roles in civil society were scrutinized by the most 
conservative Islamist groups such as lamaat-I-Islami. Iftikar Malik says, "Debates on topics such 
as whether women should be able to drive a car, attend co-educational institutions or simply go 
shopping became major issues for the government and its apologists (Malik 147). These debates 
represented a relapse in public attitudes toward women's rights, but it was the actual codified 
laws that were the most damaging to women. Zia passed his first series of Islamic laws on 
February 10, 1979. Included in this package of laws was the Hudood Ordinance.vi The Hudood 
Ordinance emphasizes the aspects of Islam that are focused on punishment rather than justice. 
This Ordinance contains a variety of criminal acts including the infamous practice of amputating 
the hands of those accused of theft and public lashings for various crimes (JalalI 01). What is of 
most importance for this discussion is its treatment of women's issues. The Offense ofZina Actvii 
issued during the February 1979 Islamisation program, stated that a hadd (literally "limit" as in 
the most severe punishment for the most severe crime allowed) punishment could be prescribed 
ifma [sane] adult man and a [sane] adult woman ... willfully have sexual intercourse without 
being validly married to each other"'(Ordinance Number 7 of 1979, Part 4). However, as 
problematic as this law is as a whole, the major problems for women come from the lack of 
sufficient distinction within the law between zina-bil-jabr and zina. The Offense of Zina Act sets 
the same requirements for the conviction of rape as for adultery. This makes rape practically 
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impossible to prove without the confession of the rapist. Also, the Hudood Ordinance allows a 
woman impregnated as the consequence of a rape to be tried for adultery (JalalI 02). Weiss asks, 
"Without a man's verbal confession, it was nearly impossible to prove his guilt, for what four 
salah men would stand by and let a woman be raped?"( 418) The Ordinance states that women 
and men convicted of zina shall face death by stoning or the reception of 100 lashes. 
Shahnaz Rouse cites Afya Zia who points out that there is not even a tenu for "rape" in 
the customary languages of Pakistan. References to rape are made through euphemisms such as 
Hizzat khona" (losing one's virtuelhonor) or Hbay-izzat karna "(causing one to lose their 
virtuelhonor). Rouse notes that these tenus do not point to rape as the violation of a woman's 
body, but as the loss of honor to her male guardian or her family (64).viii Rhonda Copelon argues 
that the "defense of honor" excuses men for their vindictive behavior. The same logic applies to 
marital rape exemption laws. Since the passage of the Hudood Ordinance, a woman cannot 
charge her husband with rape. Men are in this way given full possession of women's bodies after 
marriage. This gives every man the space to commit such crimes against their female family 
members as rape and murder ("honor killings") with impunity. These terms indicate women's 
status as the bearers of honor for their families. Women in Pakistan do not stand as individuals, 
but rather they stand as symbols of communal virtue. The control of women's bodies and 
sexuality is given legal sanction by the Hudood Ordinance. 
The laws themselves are not only discriminatory; the way "crimes" under the Hudood 
Ordinance are tried is also discriminatory. Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, prominent human 
rights activists and lawyers in Pakistan, point out that in Hudood cases, the courts trying the cases 
must be under a male Muslim judge. At the subordinate level a non-Muslim can have a non-
Muslim judge. At the federal level however, all judges and lawyers must be Muslims (Rouse 
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62). This exemplifies the state's focus on both gender and non-Muslim status as a marker of 
difference. These laws have been followed by a sharp increase in women's incarceration with the 
state and private individuals using this ordinance to their advantage as a weapon against women 
(Rouse 62). The Hudood Ordinance marks a regression, in many instances, from the status 
women had in relation to the state under colonial laws. For example, under colonial laws, 
marital rape was a recognizable offence. Rouse states that: 
Under contemporary laws, however, marital rape, is not an admissible crime, and a male 
accused of rape can claim it was consensual, thereby converting the accuser into the 
accused (under Zina charges), because the women's accusation can be cited as evidence 
of illicit sexual intercourse and can be turned against her. (Rouse 63) 
Therefore, women are discouraged from reporting a rape because of their vulnerability not only 
to the legal system but to the whims and personal biases of the police. ix Many of Asma 
Jahangir's cases are women incarcerated under charges of zina. She says: 
Today women will not file rape because they know that once they file rape, they have to 
have a foolproof case. I am a lawyer and I deal with the law everyday, and I can say quite 
confidently that if I got raped tomorrow, I would never take the risk of filing a case 
because I don't think that within this legal system I would get any justice or that I could 
sweep away the risk of being charged with zina myself. (Jahangir, interview) 
A month before the passage of the Hudood Ordinance, Zia made a surprising move and 
set up a Women's Division as a part of the Cabinet Secretariat with the purpose of safeguarding 
the needs of women in the government and non-governmental policies. However, the impact of 
this group has been nonlinal. In fact, Jalal points out that many of the most repressive laws 
relating to women were passed after the formation of this group. The Qisas (retaliation) and 
Diyat (blood-money) Ordinance was proposed in 1980. This proposed law stated that the 
monetary compensation accorded to the victim's family should only be half for women as 
compared to the compensation for the murder of a man. Fortunately, widespread protest from 
women's activists prevented this law from making it to the books. These laws point to the 
hostile political climate for women during this period. Women's rights had regressed to their 
lowest point in Pakistan's short history. 
The Cases ofSafia Bibi and Lal Mai 
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Since the passage of the Hudood Ordinance, hundreds of women have been charged with 
the crime of zina. Most of the women affected by these laws are poor women. In Pakistan, class 
cleavages are extremely sharp. Under fonnal state laws, all women are subject to repression. 
However, in practice, women of upper classes are able to escape trial or punishment because of 
their class position. For middle and upper class women these laws are less threatening as the 
state is more willing to tum a blind eye to their "sexual transgressions"(JalaI102). Zia's 
Islamisation program did not question the honor of middle and upper-class women: "To do so 
would have meant eroding the very basis of the social accommodations which for so long had 
underpinned relations the state and middle- and upper-class families in Pakistani society (lalal 
103). Poor women, however, have no protection from their male family members or from the 
state. They have no place in the power structure, and therefore, the state has no stake in 
providing them with any protection from human rights violations. 
Human Rights NGOs have recently begun to document the cases of people charged under 
this repressive law. In 1993 Human rights groups reported that 75-80% of women in prison were 
charged with offenses under the Hudood Ordinance, and many of these women were assaulted 
while in police custody (Rouse 61). Radhika Coomeraswamy describes one of the most famous 
cases that came under the Hudood Ordinance: Safia Bibi was a blind girl who alleged that she 
was raped. Two days before delivering the child that was the result of this rape, her father filed 
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an official complaint about the rape with the police. The report was not made earlier because of 
the shame and humiliation felt by her parents as a result of the rape. The accused rapist claimed 
that Safia was of "loose virtue." Safia was convicted of zina under the Hudood Ordinance and 
was sentenced to 15 lashes, three years imprisonment and a fine of 1000 rupees because she 
could not produce the required four male witnesses of the crime (Jalal 102). When news of this 
particular case was made known, there was a national and international outcry. The Federal 
Shariat Court dismissed the case as a result. However, the alleged rapist never spent one day in 
prison because of "insufficient evidence"(Coomeraswamy 50). The Safia Bibi case was both a 
victory and a loss. It seems absurd to call this case a victory, but in the Pakistani context where 
women are not protected against crimes such as rape, the fact that Safia did not have to spend 
time in jail could be considered a small victory for the NGOs that mobilized against this double 
violation. Not all women have been so lucky. For example, on 30th September 1983, Lal Mai 
from Liaquatpur became the first women to be publicly whipped for the offense of zina. An 
estimated 8000 men watched her receive 15 lashes (Malik 148). Hundreds of cases like Safia 
Bibi's and Lal Mai' s have bee filed since the passage of the Hudood Ordinance and in fact, more 
than half of the women in prison in Pakistan have been convicted of "crimes" under the 
repressive and regressive Hudood Ordinance. 
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Private Torture, Public Irresponsibility 
"'Among the most lethal forces which impact women's [on] dignity and security are customary 
practices which aim at preserving female sUbjugation. Often defended and sanctified as 
cultural traditions, they are usually fiercely defended by those who practice them, shrugged off 
by society and condoned by law-enforcing agencies and the courts. As a result, most of these 
inhuman practices continue unabated. '"-Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women, 
August 1997 (AI 1) 
Violence against women is endemic in Pakistan.x Women are faced with violence in all 
spheres of life. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan states in their 1997 report that 
women of the poor and middle classes were the most vulnerable to violations: "Their 
resourcelessness [sic] not only made them the primary target of the police and the criminals; it 
also rendered them more vulnerable to oppressive customs and mores inside homes and 
outside"(l84). Studies have shown that between 20 and 67 percent of women worldwide have 
faced violence in intimate heterosexual relationships at the hands of their male partners (Copelon 
120). In Pakistan the rate of domestic violence is much higher with estimates ranging from 70 to 
95 percent (Human Rights Watch (HRW), Conclusion). This violence not only takes place 
between heterosexual partners but is also inflicted on women by their fathers, brothers, and in-
laws. Because gender inequality is closely connected to domestic violence, the high rate of 
violence against women in Pakistan points to the severe cultural and social biases against 
women. It is also an indication of the government's incompetence in dealing with violence 
against women in the legal system. An understanding of domestic violence as torture brings to 
light the systematic nature of these assaults on women. This torture is not only inflicted on 
women by their family members, but also by the Pakistani state in its lack of response to these 
cnmes. 
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"The methods of intimate violence resemble the common methods of torture, and include 
beating with hands or objects, biting spitting, punching, kicking, slashing, stabbing, strangling, 
scalding, burning, and attempted drowning"(Copelon 123). Like victims of state-sponsored 
torture, victims of domestic violence endure constant dread and fear of violence for long periods 
of time--often over the course of their entire lives. This private torture causes psychological and 
physical pain. The psychological torture endured by victims of domestic violence at the hands of 
their male relatives is heightened by the lack of societal response to their suffering. Because the 
Pakistani government does not take measures to prevent domestic violence, they are partially 
responsible for the psychological trauma experienced by victims of private torture. The complete 
lack of recourse for women leaves them completely alienated and thus increases their suffering. 
In this way the private torture of women is compounded by public irresponsibility. The First 
Conference of European Ministers on Physical and Sexual Violence held in 1991 recommended 
that states take concrete measures to prevent and respond to viole,nce against women including 
legislation, law enforcement, prevention, and social services (98). So far, Pakistan has failed to 
meet any of these recommendations and there seems to be no indication that this will change. 
Romany says that "by systematically failing to provide protections for women from 'private' 
actors who deprive women of their rights to life, liberty, and security, the state become complicit 
in the violation .... The state thus functions as an accomplice to the human rights violations and 
can be held responsible for them"(Romany 99). 
Copelon also points to the gender discrimination in murder cases where men often 
receive a lighter sentence for the murder of their female partners. She says, "In some systems a 
'defense ofhonor'-recognized by law or custom-allows the husband's jealousy or rage over the 
real or imagined offenses by the wife to excuse even homicide"(Copelon 128). In Pakistan 
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despite the overwhelming evidence of domestic violence and the reports of honor killings, the 
state refuses to formally acknowledge this problem. In fact, state officials denied the existence of 
domestic violence in Pakistan when interviewed by members of Human Rights Watch (HRW 
Conclusion). Amnesty International reports that state institutions have done extremely little 
about these crimes, and the law often provides loopholes for murderers thus keeping the practice 
in tact (AI 5). In these cases governments often do not have the motivation or the political will to 
act. States rarely have the interest in protecting women's physical and psychological health. If 
there is political will to enforce protection of women's rights, state's do not speak with a unified 
voice or act with a unified will (An-Na'im 170). Therefore, in the case of honor killings the 
Pakistani state does not have the will or interest in protecting and prosecuting cases of honor 
killings, especially when the majority of women affected do not have any political power due to 
their class positions. Honor killings are the most severe form of intimate torture. This issue has 
recently come to the forefront as a result of the reporting of local and international human rights 
organizations. 
In Pakistan hundreds of women and men are killed yearly in the name of honor, though 
the majority of victims are women. As the number of incidents appears to be rising, the reasons 
given for honor killings also seem to be widening. Honor killings are grounded on a range of 
perceived transgressions and have been based on such absurd claims as a wife not serving her 
husband's meal quickly enough (AI 5). Honor killings were originally only reported in 
Balochistan, but are now reported as well in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Upper 
Sindh, and Punjab. Though they usually occur in rural areas, honor killings have also been 
reported in urban areas. The nature of the killings varies between regions. In Sindh kari 
(literally a "black woman") and karo ('black man'), the names given to perceived sexual 
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transgressors, "are more ritualistically killed and hacked to pieces, often in view of and with 
implicit or explicit sanction of the community"(AI 6). In Punjab honor killings usually take 
place by shooting, and seem to be more individual decisions than outright community-sanctioned 
murder. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 888 women were reported 
killed in 1998. Of these 595 were at the hands of relatives and 286 were reported as honor 
killings. The Sindh Graduates Association said that in the first three months of 1999, 132 honor 
killings had been reported in Sindh (AI 6) (a region where supposedly honor killings are less 
prevalent than in other parts of the country). Most observers within Pakistan report that these 
estimates are far lower than actual incidents of honor killings. Because of the nature of the crime, 
its association with the shame of the family as well as the reluctance to view such incidents as 
actual crimes, the numbers of cases reported is very likely only a small part of the actual number 
of deaths. 
Some cases of honor killings are sanctioned by tribal councils calledjirgas who send out 
men to carry out the death warrant. Ajirga of the Afridi tribe living in Karachi ordered the death 
of Riffat Afridi and Kunwar Ahsan because the couple got married against the wishes of Riffat 
Afridi's parents. Her husband, Kunwar Ahsan, was shot at by his wife's relatives after thejirga 
ruled on the case. Ahsan is permanently injured, and the couple is seeking resettlement in another 
country (AI 6-7). This case demonstrates several important points. The couple was targeted 
because the honor of the woman's family was threatened by her independence. Also, it is an 
example of both a woman and a man being targeted for an honor killings. Men are not exempt 
from this system of honor, though they are implicated less often and only when they are 
accomplices in defiling a woman's (and therefore her family's) honor. The threat of karo-kari (a 
specific kind of honor killing) keeps women in s a perpetual state of fear (AI 7). This constant 
fear is a fonn of psychological torture inflicted on all women in Pakistan. The poet Attiya 
Dawood quotes a young girl from a Sindhi village who said: 
What is there to my body? . .Is it studded with diamonds and pearls? My brother's eyes 
forever follow me. My father's gaze guards me all the time, stem, angry ... Then why do 
they make me labour in the fields? Why don't they do all the work by themselves? We, 
the women, work in the fields all day long, bear the heat and the sun, sweat and toil and 
we tremble all day long, not knowing who may cast a look upon us. We stand accused 
and condemned to be declared kari and murdered. (Al7-8) 
This girl's words exemplify the contradictory nature of a system that does not value women's 
humanity, while investing their bodies with symbolic importance. For this reason standards of 
honor differ between women and men. Theoretically, they apply to both genders, but women 
face harsher punishments for their perceived transgressions. Men are often excused of illicit 
behavior where a woman's life is in danger at the hint of her 'impropriety'(AI 8). 
Amnesty International's report states that the two main factors that contribute to this 
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practice are Hwomen's commodification and conceptions ofhonour"(9). Dr. Tahira Shahid Khan 
of Shirkat Gah, an NGO working for women's rights, says that "'Women are considered the 
property of males in their family irrespective of their class, ethnic or religious groups. The owner 
of the property has the right to decide its fate. The concept of ownership has turned women into 
a commodity which can be exchanged, bought and sold"(Al9). Women's commodification 
occurs in cultures across the world. In Pakistan this commodification takes on deadly 
proportions. The honor of the family resides in the body, and more specifically, the woman's 
body. The Amnesty report states: "Women are seen to embody the honour of the men to whom 
they belong and through them of the family and tribe whose right over them they must 
respect. .. Women have no honour of their own"(Al 11). Therefore, women must constantly 
guard their virginity and their chastity. For a woman to enter into an adulterous relationship 
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subverts the social order and undeffi1ines the ownership rights to her body. Tribal tradition 
supports the notion that a man can regain his honor by killing the woman who has transgressed. 
He is supported in this at legally (by customary law) and morally by others in the community (AI 
11). The law of the nation-state does not apply to women in many parts of Pakistan. The 
primary justice system in tribal areas of Pakistan is based on traditions and custom that preexist 
the nation. However, the laws of the nation, such as the Hudood Ordinance, also do not protect 
women and often reinforce women's status as the property of men. 
Tile Case of Samia Sarwar 
There have been several reported cases of fathers bringing charges of zina against their 
daughters for marrying of their own accord. In one such case a woman, Sher Bano had eloped 
with a man who she had willfully married and was apprehended and arrested under the Zina 
Ordinance. On August 6, 1997 she was shot dead by her brother as she emerged from the court 
room in Peshawar (AI 15). In this way the Hudood Ordinance reinforces the practice of honor 
killing by legally formalizing the social control of women and their status as bearers of honor. 
One of the most widely publicized recent cases was that of Samia Sarwar (also referred to as 
Samia Imran). 
Samia Sarwar married her cousin in 1989 in Peshawar. During the time of her marriage 
she was subjected to years of severe physical abuse at the hands of her husband. In April of 
1995, she returned to her family's home to escape her abusive husband because he had thrown 
her down the stairs while she was pregnant with her second child. Though she was allowed to 
live with her parents, they would not allow her to get a divorce. When Sarwar expressed her 
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intention to get a divorce, her parents threatened to kill her. Hina Jilani, SaIWar's lawyer said, 
"Samia was a frightened, unhappy woman who felt very alone in a predicament that she couldn't 
deal with confidently." On March 26, 1999, Samia took the opportunity of her parents' absence 
for a pilgrimage to Mecca to flee to Lahore and seek help at the AGHS (a law firm that works on 
won1en's issues) and refuge in the AGHS-run shelter, Dastak. Because her life had been 
threatened, Sarwar refused to meet with any of her male relatives. However, because she needed 
her marriage papers in order to get a divorce, Sarwar agreed to meet with her mother. Their 
meeting was set for April 6, 1999, in the office ofHina Jilani. Samia's mother came 
accompanied by her uncle Yunus Sarwar and a driver, Habibur Rehman. When Jilani asked the 
men to leave the room, Samia'a mother said that she needed the driver's help in order to walk. 
At that point Habibur Rehman pulled out a gun and shot Samia in the head, killing her instantly. 
Jilani was also fired at, but the bullet missed. Shortly after Samia was killed, the gun-man, 
Rehman was shot as a result of his having threatened a security guard. Yunus Sarwar who was 
waiting in the antechamber, took hold of the AGHS paralegal Shahtaj Qisalbash and escaped 
with Samia's mother. Qisalbash was taken with them and she claims to have heard the father ask 
the two if"the job was done." Qisalbash was released unharmed (AI 20)(HRW Summary). 
Though this crime was committed in full public view with several witnesses, nothing has 
been done to prosecute Sarwar's family. On April 20, police officers went to Sarwar's village to 
issue warrants for the family's arrest, but they were "shooed away" according to human rights 
organizations. Several reports were filed thereafter. The media reported that the response in 
NWFP oveIWhelmingly sided with the murderers. This attitude also surfaced in the Pakistani 
Senate. When Pakistan People's Party Senator Iqbal Haider presented a resolution condemning 
the killing, Senator Ilyas Bilour said in reference to Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani: "'We have 
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fought for human rights and civil liberties all our lives but wonder what sort of human rights are 
being claimed by these girls in jeans "'(AI 21). This exhibits the complete disregard for women's 
rights even at the most superficial level of rhetoric by some Pakistani political leaders. The fact 
that a cold-blooded murder was argued in such a fashion, even when there was such wide 
international media coverage, speaks to the absence of any public support for women in Pakistan. 
The Sarhad Chamber of Commerce of which Samia's father was the president issued a statement 
on April 8 and 9, demanding that Jahangir and Jilani be dealt with in accordance with "tribal and 
Islamic law" and be arrested for "misleading women in Pakistan and contributing to the country's 
bad image abroad." SeveralfatwasXi were also issued against both activists with reward money 
stipulated for their murderers. Finally, in April of 1999 Jahangir issued a First Information 
Report (FIR) with the police against 16 people for threatening the lives of her and her sister. She 
also called on the government to investigate over 300 cases of honor killings reported in 1998. 
At the time of Amnesty's report, the state had taken no action (AI 21). The case ofSamia Sarwar 
is one of many such cases reported in the last year. I have focused on this one specifically 
because it received wide international attention especially through the networks of women's 
human rights organizations. However, even with the international outcry against this injustice, 
the state did not act. This case also exemplifies the dangerous nature of organizing for women's 
rights in Pakistan. Even at risk of their own lives, Jilani and Jahangir continue to speak out about 
injustices in Pakistan. 
Are Pakistani Women a Group?: Challenges within ti,e Women's Rights Movement 
Seventy-five percent of women on Pakistan live in rural areas and many of these women 
live in abject poverty. The majority of these women are illiterate and have little knowledge either 
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of doctrinal Islam (on which much of their relationship with state institutions in based) or of their 
rights both within and outside of Islam (Jalal 77). As I noted earlier, these women are the most 
vulnerable to the repressive legal system. The report of the Commission on the Status of Women 
released in 1986 states that: 
The prevailing milieu being still feudal and anachronistic, illiteracy, ill-health, poverty 
and an iniquitous social dispensation continue to cause a deterioration of the condition of 
deprived and vulnerable sectors, particularly women in the rural areas and urban slums. 
Seclusion, segregation and confinement which have limited women's educational and 
economic opportunities, coupled with early marriages and large families continue to 
preclude the mass of women from all avenues of advancement. (Malik 151) 
The report adds that Wthe average rural women [sic] of Pakistan is born in near slavery, leads a 
life of drudgery and dies invariably in oblivion1H(Jalal 77). Sixteen percent of Pakistani women 
qualify as literate, and Pakistan has one of the lowest rates of female participation in the paid 
labor force in the world (Jalal 77). The Commission's report cited above also found that 
women's participation in the labor force declined 3% between 1977-1983 (1 09)-probably due 
to the official discouragement of female paid work during the Zia regime. However, it is 
important to note here that statistics on the "official" labor force do not adequately represent 
women's lives. In 1997, women's participation in the paid labor force was less than a third of 
men's. However, in practice this was not the case: 
In the villages some 15 million women worked at a variety of agricultural chores, 
including some of the most arduous ones. In many places they spent half the daylight 
hours fetching water from long distances for cattle and the family, the other half tending 
to the cattle and the crops, and the evenings devoted to household chores. (HRCP 190) 
Therefore, it is extremely misleading to state that women in Pakistan do not participate in the 
labor force. Their labor in different areas accounts for the sustenance of their families and their 
communities. 
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lalal is careful to note the differences between women in Pakistan as in other parts of the 
world. She says: 
As in other parts of the world, rural-urban differences, not to mention social, economic 
and regional disparities divide women quite as much as the weight of religious precepts 
and local customs separate them from men. Indeed to speak of Pakistani women without 
qualification is to lump them in a category defined by legal aggregation rather than 
sociological fact. (lalal 78) 
Therefore, it is important to understand that one cannot speak of all Pakistani women as having 
the same interests or the same relationship to the state or power. Rights for women in Pakistan 
are always mediated by a web of social factors including, but not limited to, their gender. 
For poor women lalal points out that there is little or no choice but subservience to societal 
dictates. Placed at the bottom of the power structure, poor women are bound by their class 
position to follow strict gender roles. 
For women in the upper classes, submission to subordination can to a limited extent be 
rewarding. "So long as they not transgress social norms, women from the middle and upper 
strata in the rural and urban areas alike are accorded respect as well as a modicum of privileges 
within the sphere of the family and, depending upon their generational and marital status, also in 
wider social networks"(Jalal 78). Most women from upper social strata do not transgress social 
boundaries because they do not want to challenge their social standing. The retrogressive Islamic 
legislation has left this group of women largely unaffected (Jalal 78). The state turns a blind eye 
to the "transgressions" of the privileged classes because of their connections to state power. 
lalal says that women from privileged positions in society often participate in the reproduction of 
gender biases; this fact must be acknowledged, and those women must be held responsible for 
their actions (or inaction) (78). 
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The articulation of women's rights in Pakistan has largely come from the educated, urban 
middle and upper classes. This strata's discourse has been limited by their positions: 
As beneficiaries of social accommodations worked out over long periods of history, 
middle and upper class women everywhere have a stake in preserving the existing 
structures of authority, and with it the convenience of a subservience that denies them 
equality in the public realm but also affords privileges not available to women lower 
down the rungs of the social hierarchy. (Jalal 79) 
As the leaders of the struggle for women's rights in Pakistan, this group has worked toward 
limited change. In order to work for real social change, women's groups in Pakistan must 
actively recognize the plight of poor women as the most vulnerable sector of society. They must 
also take measures to incorporate the views of poor women in the rhetoric of the women's rights 
movement. 
Rhetorical contradictions in the ideology of the state have allowed the Pakistani 
government to protect the liberal citizens of Pakistan in their deviations from the literal 
interpretations of Islam. Jalal argues that "the state would tolerate all variants of Muslims, even 
the occasional emancipated women, only so long as its own Islamic credentials-intrinsic to its 
claims to be legitimate-were not put to the test"( 89). This has allowed a handful of upper-class 
women in Pakistan's history to take active roles in the Pakistani political sphere. The first 
women's organization, the All-Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), was founded by one 
such woman, the wife of the former prime minister, Rana Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1949. This 
organization was given formal approval by the state as an example of its "progressive" attitude 
toward women's emancipation. However, Jalal attributes this state support to the elite origins of 
the leadership of the group as well as its largely apolitical concerns. The state chose APW A over 
the prospect of working-class dominated groups, which would force the state to be held 
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accountable for the economic deprivation of the vast majority of Pakistani women (Jalal 90). 
Therefore, women's rights in Pakistan have historically only reflected a small group of women's 
voices. The vast majority of women in Pakistan remain invisible to both the state and to 
women's rights organizations. However, the class stratification of the women's rights movement 
is changing. 
Conclusions: The Way Forward 
Zia's Islamisation program, apart from creating a more restrictive society for women, 
pushed women's rights activists to organize. However, the seeds of this activity had existed 
since the 70s. Malik says, "While APW A and other organizations received their membership 
largely from the upper classes, women's organizations in the cities like the Women's Front, 
Shirkat Gah and Aurat presented a new generation of urban, middle-class professional 
women"(l46). Zia's policies infuriated a small, vocal group of middle and upper class women 
and put them face-to-face with the regime. In 1981, Shirkat Gah reemerged with the name 
Women's Action Forum (WAF) (Malik 146). This group was at the forefront of women's rights 
organizing during the 1980s. The direct impetus for the formation of this group was the 
sentencing under the Hudood Ordinance of a IS-year old girl to flogging after she married a man 
against her parent's wishes (Jalall03). On February Ith 1983, hundreds of women led by the 
WAF and other women's groups protested the proposed Law of Evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat) in 
Lahore. These protesters were met with tear-gas and baton charges by the police. Within a 
month of this incident, the Majlis-I-Shura, Zia's Islamic Parliament, passed the Law of Evidence. 
Zia waited one year before signing the bill, and restricted it only to financial transactions (Jalal 
106). However, the bill served its symbolic purpose of devaluing women as citizens and the 
44 
passage and signature of the bill displayed the disrespect of the women's groups by the state 
apparatus. 
lalal states that women's groups such WAF failed to place the use of Islam for political 
purposes by the state under scrutiny. The Pakistani state, since the Zia regime, has used Islam as 
its legitimating factor because of the lack of actual popular support. 1 alaI says: 
By failing to exploit the contradictions between the state's use of Islam as ideology and 
the uncertain advantages of Islam as politics in Pakistani society, women's organizations 
such as APWA and WAF have left unscathed some of the more contrived affinities 
between Islam and the Pakistani state"{J alall 07). 
The demands of women's groups and female political figures have historically been couched 
within the tenns of Islam. Deniz Kandiyoti mentions this discursive restriction for women's 
advocates. She says that feminists in Muslim contexts must stay within the boundaries of Islam 
in order to remain effective in the political arena (Kandiyoti 380). To advocate secularism is to 
risk societal alienation. lalal says, "With the Islamic dagger lying so close to the heart of 
women's case for a better and fairer deal, it is not surprising that so few of their self-professed 
representatives could argue for rights without first asserting their religious convictions"(91-92). 
Therefore, women's groups have often taken an apologetic tone in their arguments for human 
rights. These women often expressed the notion that Islam accords women ample rights, and the 
problem lies with the faulty execution of these rights by the state (J alaI 92). Where this position 
is partially true in that the Qur'an does call for equality between the sexes, it also limits the 
critique of injunctions in the Qur'an and the Hadith that reinforce women's status as the property 
of men. This discursive limitation also affects the defense of victims of human rights violations. 
Shahnaz Rouse notes that many activists begin their discussions of crimes against women by 
citing the individual woman's history of "virtue" and morality before denouncing the violations 
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she has suffered (Rouse 64). Activists end up reinforcing notions of honor and virtue that are so 
detrimental to women's rights in their individual arguments. 
In order to correct some of the class biases exhibited by women's groups in the past, J alaI 
suggests that women's organizations attempt to organize across classes. She suggests that NGOs 
follow the lead of groups such as the Karachi chapter of the WAF, which has forged links with 
the rural group, Sindhiani Tehrik, and base their actions on coalitions with socially disadvantaged 
groups (Jalall07). The lack of coalitions between women's groups and other groups who are 
marginalized politically has weakened the potential of broad-based changed in the system. It is 
because of this weakness that Benazir Bhutto did not make women's issues a priority during her 
terms as prime-minister (JalalI 07). Though the PPP under Bhutto stated that they would repeal 
discriminatory laws such as the Law of Evidence and the Hudood Ordinance, they never did. 
Jalal says that "For the vast majority of Pakistani women, little is likely to change, so long as 
their urban sisters continue to tolerate a modicum of subservience in public affairs in return for 
state policies that leave their not inconsiderable privileges untouched"(108). She focuses her 
argument on the need for change in the entire social structure in Pakistan. J alaI argues that 
women will never achieve gender equity until they address the class contradictions of the system 
as well the gender imbalances. Gender equity must be connected to the various levels of social 
stratification in Pakistan. 
The discourse of human rights is quickly becoming more prominent on a global scale as 
well as in Pakistan. Pakistani human rights organizations have been successful in bringing 
national and international attention to women's rights in Pakistan. Working within a complex 
system of power relations within a post-colonial state, Pakistani women's rights NGOs are 
contributing to international discussions of women's rights. Due to the constant shifts of 
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leadership in Pakistan, it is extremely difficult to work for change especially in legal changes. 
The regime of Zia-ul Haq revealed the precariousness of women's rights in Pakistan. The nation 
has not yet recovered from the regressive policies that he enacted. Powerful groups of 
conservative elites have slowed the progress of women's human rights in every realm. Rashida 
Patel says, "Vested interests find that illiteracy, ignorance, superstition, fatalism and blind faith 
in the clergy (Maulanas) are great allies in the maintenance of the status quo"(36). The pairing 
of extreme poverty with religious conservatism allows parts of the population to be manipUlated 
into the support of repressive beliefs and official policies in the name of Islam. Because the 
literacy rate in so low, most people are not able to study the religious texts for themselves, and 
therefore, they must rely on the opinions of maulvis'Cii for the interpretations of their faith. For 
women, this equation has been extremely negative. 
Support for women's rights in Pakistan is quickly crushed by the religious right. In 1992, 
Mr. Kachkal Ali, a member of the Baluchistan Assembly, argued on the floor that the Law of 
Evidence, the Hudood Ordinance, and the allowance for men to have four wives was 
"suppression of women." The Islamist supporters quickly accused Mr. Ali of desecrating Islamic 
tenets and of breaking his oath as a member of the Assembly. Mr. Ali was forced to make a 
formal apology for his "blasphemous" comments (Patel 37). This is clear evidence of the limits 
of discourse in Pakistani society. Even for a powerful man to voice his opposition to what is 
clearly discriminatory toward women in a setting that is supposedly democratic is unacceptable. 
Islam is used and abused by the powerful in order to quell free expression and free thought by 
women and men in Pakistan. This limitation also affected Benazir Bhutto, the first female prime 
minister of Pakistan who failed to correct some of the legislative wrongs instigated by the Zia 
regime, despite her promises to do so. It is unclear whether she ever had genuine intentions of 
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promoting the status of women. Her stays in power have been short and tumultuous, and 
therefore, even if she had wanted to repeal such laws as the Hudood Ordinance, it can be argued 
that she did not have time to do this. Many of her apologists have taken this position in her 
defense. Nawaz Sharif followed in the footsteps ofZia and increasingly aligned himself with 
Islamist forces in Pakistan advocating such legislation as the Shari 'at Bill, which would put even 
more power in the hands of conservative Islamists. Currently, Nawaz Sharif has been ousted and 
Pakistan is again ruled by a military government. General Pervez Musharraf is the new head of 
the government and it is yet unclear how he will handle the issues of women's human rights. 
One can only hope that his regime will not follow in the footsteps of the previous military 
government. 
Because of this constant political turmoil, human rights NGOs must become even more 
organized. The Pakistani state has a responsibility to bring their domestic laws in line with 
international human rights norms, especially since they are signatories of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDA W). This applies not only to 
formal laws, but also to customary or religious laws (which mayor may not be written into the 
state legislation or Constitution). An-Na'im argues that "every state has the responsibility to 
remove any inconsistency between international human rights law binding on it, on the one had, 
and religious and customary laws operating within the territory of the state, on the other"(An-
Na'im 168). Using international human rights in their local contexts, Pakistani NGOs must 
advocate for the Pakistani state to abide by international laws. Because Pakistan did sign 
CEDA Win 1996 and is also a signatory of the Convention against the Torture, women's rights 
organizations can use these documents to hold the government accountable for its lack of 
attention to women's human rights. An-Na'im also discusses the problems of making 
governments responsible for women's rights protections using the examples of land tenure 
refonn and female genital mutilation. His analogy can also be applied to the practice of honor 
killings in Pakistan. He says that because many repressive practices come from religious or 
customary sanction, efforts to change these practices should also come from the same sources 
(An-Na'im 178). In the Pakistani context it may be most effective to continue to argue from 
within the framework of Islam. Because Islam is such an integral part of the identity of the 
nation, abandoning Islam risks the loss of support among the majority of the population. 
However, this does not mean that Islamic precepts cannot be reinterpreted and placed in 
historical context by women's rights advocates: 
The need for cultural sensitivity and discretion in providing external support is 
underscored by the fact that those acting as internal agents of change are liable to be 
regarded by local religious or political forces as subversive elements acting on behalf of 
imperial interests or alien powers and cultures. (An-Na'im 179-180) 
It is strategically advantageous to continue argue within the boundaries of Islam in order to be 
convincing and to subvert the risk of being labeled "outside agents." 
Many groups have been successfully working within Islam in order to push for the 
protection of human rights. The Commission on the Status of Women, for example, used the 
Qur'an and Islamic jurisprudence to argue for family planning and against child marriage. Its 
members also tried to present Ita more rational view on polygamy, divorce, khula (a woman's 
right to seek separation), alimony and remarriage of divorcees and widows (Malik 157). They 
made these recommendations during the regime of Zia-ul Haq, understanding that these views 
were a direct affront to the conservative view of Islam advocated by the regime. Though those 
who argue from within Islam should be supported at the national and international levels, the 
space for secular discourse must be reopened in Pakistan. Those who do not wish to remain 
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within Islam should not have to do so. Those who see Islam as a limitation to the realization of 
women's rights are entitled to their position, and this too must be respected and supported by 
human rights organizations and the state. The Pakistani state and human rights organizations 
must actively work for the practice of truly democratic principles in the political arena. As long 
as such weapons of the political right as the blasphemy laws remain codified legally and 
culturally, the space for discussion and application of human rights principles will remain 
limited. 
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Notes 
i "Fundamentalism" is a tenn that has more recently been replaced in scholarship by "Islamism" 
This is the tenn preferred by most Muslim scholars including An-Na'im. 
ii I focus specifically on the ideas of the leaders of Pakistan at the time of Partition in order to 
point specifically to the ideologies of the nation at its inception. This focus points to the 
contradictions and gaps in the founding ideology of the nation that allowed for Islamism to 
emerge in a legitimate space within the state's discourse during Zia's regime. 
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iii For a more detailed account of Islamist groups in Pakistan and women's voluntary participation 
in these groups see Khawar Mumtaz's "Identity Politics and Women" 'Fundamentalism' and 
Women in Pakistan" in Identity Politics and Women ed. V. Moghadam. 
iv Rouse says that throughout Pakistan modernizing history, women's roles in the public sphere 
have been separate from those of men. Women's limited insertion into the public sphere during 
Bhutto's rule did not change their private status either. Women's work was either doubled or 
they were cast out of their previous roles and replaced by men. Rouse says that women's 
separation from men in both spheres may have been more emphasized during the Zia period 
(since 1977), but this separation pre-existed this time period (Rouse 56). 
v Here, the danger of difference becomes clear. The preservation of difference, as theorists such 
as Charlesworth argue, can quickly be turned against women. Clearly, in the case of Pakistan 
under Zia, women were considered different from men, but this conception of difference worked 
to oppress women rather than promote any notion of human rights. 
vi "The word 'hudood' is the plural of 'hadd,' a term denoting the Islamic legal categorization of 
crimes for which the definition and punishment is set by God." from "Her Honor: An Islamic 
Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive Perspective" by Asifa Quraishi 
vii Section 4 and 5 of the ff Offence ofZina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance ":" (4) Zina : A 
man and a woman are said to commit 'Zina' if they willfully have sexual intercourse without 
being validly married to each other. (5) - 1) 'Zina' is liable to 'Hadd' if- a) it is committed by a 
man who is an adult and is not insane with a woman to whom he is not, and does not suspect 
himself to be married; or b) it is committed by a woman who is an adult and is not insane with a 
man to whom she is not, and does not suspect herself to be married. - 2) Whoever is guilty of 
'Zina' liable to 'Hadd' shall, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance- a) ifhe or she is a 
'Muhsan', be stoned to death at a public place; or b) ifhe or she is not a 'Muhsan', be punished, 
at a public place, with Whipping numbering one hundred stripes. - 3) No punishment under sub-
section (2) shall be executed until it has been confinned by the Court to which an appeal from the 
order of conviction lies; and if the punishment be of whipping, until it is confinned and 
executed, the convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to simple 
imprisonment. " 'Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman', Section 16 
of the " Offence ofZina (Enforcement ofHudood) Ordinance" : " Whoever takes or entices 
away any woman with intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person, or conceals or 
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detains with that intent any woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 
a term which may extend to seven years and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall 
also be liable to a fine. " 
(from http://www.interpol.intlPublic/ChildreniSexuaIAbuselNationaILaws/csaPakistan. asp ) 
viii Shahnaz Rouse says that there has been a breakdown in the pUblic/private split in Pakistan in 
the treatment of women. This has evidenced itself in the increase and increasing acceptability of 
public harassment of women. This loss of respect (also tenned as izzat) of women in public has 
led to a call by some activists for a return to the previous "respect" women were given in society. 
Rouse says that this runs the risk of ignoring the private abuses endured by women throughout 
history. She says that rather than argue for an older version of private patriarchy, the rhetoric of 
izzat must be overturned completely, so that women are not considered the bearers of honor in 
any sphere, public or private (Rouse 68). 
ix The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports that the police used the threat of the 
Hudood Ordinance in order to assault women with impunity. In one case a police SUb-inspector, 
Manzoor Shah, was accused of taking a 14 year old girl out of detention and keeping her in his 
home for a week in order to rape her. The police threatened the girl's father with violence if he 
did not withdraw his complaint. The police are given virtual impunity and are often among the 
worst violators of the rights of women and girls. Not only do they not provide protection, 
women and girls must be protected against violations at the hands of the police. "The cases of 
assault in custody, for obvious reasons, almost never got reported but the informed assumption 
was that rarely a woman or a girl who fell in police hands went unassaulted"(HRCP 185). 
x Rouse cites some of the recent statistics about violence against women in Pakistan. In 1993, 
NGOs also reported that a woman is raped every three hours. Fifty percent of these were minors 
and twenty-five percent of the total were gang raped. Public humiliations occurred at the rate of 
four every month on the province of Punjab alone. This entails stripping a woman and parading 
her in public. Domestic violence was also reported on the rise. Death by stove burning also 
occurred at the rate of one every other day. (Rouse 61) 
xi A Jatwa is a legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader. 
xiiThe Urdu word for an Islamic religious leader. Often, and in this context, it refers to an 
obscurantist Islamic leader. 
